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Recent Decisions
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT-FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-STANDING-ECONOMIC
MOTIVE-RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND PREDICATE
ACTS-ABORTION CLINICS-The United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act does not require proof that either the
racketeering enterprise or the racketeering acts were predicated
by an economic motive.
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994).
The National Organization for Women ("NOW") is a national
nonprofit association that endorses legalized abortion.' The Del-
aware Women's Health Organization ("DWHO") and the Summit
Women's Health Organization ("SWHO") are health care provid-
ers of abortions and other medical procedures.2 NOW, DWHO,
and SWHO (collectively, the "Petitioners") filed a complaint
against Joseph Scheidler and Pro-Life Action Network ("PLAN")
(collectively, the "Respondents").3 The Respondents were a coali-
tion of anti-abortion groups that opposed the availability and
practice of legalized abortion.4
The Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking injunctive relief,
1. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 801 (1994).
2. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
3. Id. The other parties named in the complaint were John Patrick Ryan,
Randall A. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad Wojnar, Timothy Murphy, Monica
Migliorino, Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc., Pro-Life Action League, Inc., Pro-Life Direct
Action League, Inc., Operation Rescue, and Project Life. Id. at 801 n.1
4. Id. at 801.
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treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. According to Respon-
dent Scheidler's congressional testimony, anti-abortion groups
attempt to close down abortion clinics and convince women not
to have abortions.6 The Petitioners' initial complaint alleged
Sherman Act7 violations and was later amended to include
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
claims.8 The amended complaint maintained that the Respon-
dents were participants in a nationwide conspiracy directed at
terminating, through a scheme of racketeering activity, the oper-
ation of abortion clinics.' The women's rights organization and
the abortion clinics alleged that the Respondents conspired to
use extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act," to persuade clinic
employees and doctors to quit their careers in medicine and
persuade patients to relinquish their opportunity to obtain medi-
cal services at the clinics." The complaint further alleged that
the conspiracy damaged the business and property interests of
the Petitioners and that PLAN was a racketeering enterprise.12
The district court concluded that NOW, DWHO, and SWHO
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and,
accordingly, dismissed the case. 3 The district court found that
the Sherman Act did not apply because the alleged activities
5. Id. at 801.
6. Id.
7. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Sherman Act prohibits the forma-
tion of groups that inhibit commerce or trade. Id. Any individual who participates in
such a forbidden group is subject to felony charges. Id.
8. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938-39, 941-42,
944 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), reu'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and
(d) (1988). Subsection (a) provides that it is illegal to use money that has been gen-
erated from racketeering acts. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Subsection (b) prohibits any indi-
vidual to obtain an interest in an enterprise through racketeering acts or by illegal
money. Id. at § 1962(b). Subsection (c) states that it is illegal for anyone, who is in-
volved with an enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate commerce, to be
connected with racketeering activity, Id. at § 1962(c). Subsection (d) provides that it
is illegal for an individual to devise a scheme that violates RICO §§ 1962(a), (b), or
(c). Id. at § 1962 (d).
9. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 938-39.
10. Id. at 941. The Hobbs Act makes it illegal to prevent, hinder, or affect
interstate commerce by extortion, robbery, attempts, or conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a) (1988). Extortion is defined as the taking of property by force or fright or
through an implied authority. Id. at § 1951(b)(2).
11. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 938-39, 941.
12. Id. at 941, 943 n.4. See note 28 for the statutory definition of "enterprise".
13. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 939, 945. The district court dismissed the case
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 12(b)(6)
provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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involved political, rather than commercial objectives." The
court dismissed the claim under RICO section 1962(a) because
the income that PLAN generated was in the form of voluntary
contributions and was not obtained from the pattern of racke-
teering activities that was alleged in the complaint.15 In addi-
tion, the court dismissed the claim under RICO section 1962(c)
because the Petitioners did not maintain that the alleged racke-
teering activities and racketeering enterprise were economically
motivated.' Lastly, the court dismissed the RICO conspiracy
claim under section 1962(d) because the other RICO claims
could not stand. 7
Agreeing that donations were not income generated from a
pattern of racketeering activities, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision." The
court of appeals held that non-economic crimes with non-eco-
nomic motives were not covered under RICO and concluded that
the Respondents' acts were not actionable under either the
Sherman Act or RICO. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 to de-
cide whether RICO required that either the racketeering enter-
prise or the racketeering activities have an economic motive.2'
The initial question before the Court was whether the Petition-
ers had standing to submit their claim.' The Court stated that
standing was a jurisdictional requirement and was reviewable at
all stages of litigation.' Because the clinics alleged that their
14. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 943-44.
17. Id. at 944.
18. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 614, 625 (7th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
19. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 614, 629-31.
20. National Org. of Women v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993).
21. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 802. The Supreme Court's primary objective was
to settle the circuit courts diverging treatment of RICO's reputed economic require-
ment. id. Compare United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) and United
States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988)
(holding that a claim under RICO requires an enterprise to have an economic mo-
tive) with Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (holding that a claim under RICO does not require an
economic goal). The Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the
Respondents' acts were within the scope of the Sherman Act; however, the court of
appeals concluded that the Respondents' acts were not actionable under the Sherman
Act. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 623.
22. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 802. A person has "standing" if he has a legally
protectible interest in the proceeding. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
Standing is an issue of jurisdiction that involves the legal capability of courts to
hear and rule on cases. Id.
23. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 802. A complaint that is dismissed at the pleading
1994
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business and property interests were damaged, the Court held
that DWHO and SWHO had standing at the pleading stage.'
After deciding the preliminary question of standing, the Court
addressed the issue of whether RICO required an underlying
economic motive in either the racketeering enterprise or racke-
teering acts.25 The language in RICO sections 1961 and 1962
was analyzed separately and collectively by the Court to deter-
mine whether an implied economic motive existed.28 In the
Court's opinion, section 1962(c) prohibited individuals who are
involved with an enterprise to engage in racketeering acts,27
and section 1961 defined both enterprise and racketeering activi-
ty with no explicit reference to economic motive.28 The Court
held, therefore, that under sections 1961 and 1962 of RICO,
there is no suggestion that a profit-seeking motive is required.'
Although the Court noted that it was likely that an enterprise
involved in interstate commerce would be motivated by profit
reasons, section 1962 of RICO also encompassed enterprises that
merely "affected" interstate commerce. 0
The Court also asserted that the use of the term "enterprise"
in sections 1962(a) and (b) did not imply that a profit-seeking
motive was required in section 1962(c).31 According to the
Court, subsections (a) and (b) refer to an enterprise that is ac-
stage must be reinstated on appeal if relief could be conferred based on any facts
that could be proved in accordance with the allegations. Id. at 803. At the pleading
stage, general injury assertions are presumed to include the necessary facts of the
claim. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992)).
24. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803. The Court noted that DWHO and SWHO, but
not NOW had sued under RICO. Id. at 802. At the district court level, NOW tried
to obtain class certification. Id. at 802 n.3 However, the district court deferred its
certification ruling until the motions to dismiss were decided. Id. When the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted, the district court discarded all
pending motions, including NOW's certification motion. Id.
25. Id. at 802. See note 28 for definitions of "racketeering enterprise" and
"racketeering activity".
26. Id. at 803-05.
27. See note 8 and accompanying text for provisions of RICO § 1962(c).
28. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803-04. RICO defines "racketeering activity" as
conduct involving felonies, drug dealing, gambling, bribery, extortion, counterfeiting,
theft, embezzlement, fraud, obscenity, hindering justice, or obstruction of commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The Act defines "enterprise' as a person, group of persons, or
business associated in fact. Id. at § 1961(4).
29. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
30. Id. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "affect"
as a detrimental influence. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (3d
ed. 1969). By referring to Webster's Dictionary, the Court reasoned that an enter-
prise could create a detrimental influence without being economically motivated.
Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
31. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804. See note 8 and accompanying text for provi-
sions of RICO §§ 1962(a). (b). and (c).
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quired by means of unlawful activity or money received from
illegal activity. 2 The Court called such enterprises the victims
of unlawful activity."3 On the other hand, subsection (c) refers
to an enterprise as the vehicle through which an illegal activity
is committed." Because a vehicle enterprise in subsection (c) is
not acquired through illegal activities, like the victim enterprise
in subsections (a) and (b), the Court held that the vehicle enter-
prise is not required to have a property interest that can be
acquired, nor a profit seeking motive, to engage in unlawful
activity. 5 The enterprise in subsection (c) must only be an
association that is involved in a pattern of racketeering activi-
ty.
3 6
Due to the fact that there is neither an express economic
motive requirement nor a reasonable implication of such in the
operative sections of RICO, the Court was unwilling to construe
a profit-seeking requirement, despite congressional findings.37
The congressional findings that preface RICO refer to activities
that drain significant money from the economy through unlawful
conduct." Because certain acts, such as the extortion that was
alleged by the Petitioners, could drain the economy without
benefiting the actors monetarily, the Court declared that an
economic motive was not necessarily implied, despite congres-
sional findings."
The Court also found that the lower court's reliance on the
1981 Department of Justice's guidelines on RICO prosecutions
was unconvincing.0 In 1984, the Department of Justice's guide-
lines were amended to extend the focus of RICO prosecutions
from associations that engage in economic activities to associa-
tions that engage in profit-seeking or other identifiable activi-
ties.41 The Court also found that (i) the statutory language of





37. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
38. Id. at 805. The congressional findings demonstrate a primary interest in
the effects of organized crime on the national economy. See Statement of Findings
and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1073. The findings state that, by engaging in illegal activities, organized crime de-
pletes substantial amounts of money from the national economy, debilitates the
strength of the nation's economy, significantly interferes with commerce and competi-
tion, poses a danger to security, and threatens the general well-being and interest of
the nation. 84 Stat. at 922-23.
39. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
40. Id. The 1981 guidelines stated that an allegation of a RICO violation did
not apply to an association that was not economically motivated. Id.
41. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 9-
1994
Duquesne Law Review
RICO was unambiguous; (ii) there was no clear legislative histo-
ry that evidenced a contrary intent; and (iii) the rule of lenity
did not apply when statutory language was unambiguous."
Finally, the unanimous Court held that DWHO and SWHO
had standing to bring this action, providing that the abortion
clinics established that the Respondents conducted their enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activities.' In conclu-
sion, the Court ruled that RICO did not mandate that an eco-
nomic motive exist in the racketeering enterprise or the racke-
teering activities."
A concurring opinion by Justice Souter, which was joined by
Justice Kennedy, stated that First Amendment freedom of
speech defenses were not barred by the Court's opinion. 5 By
finding that the statutory language was unambiguous, that a
low correlation to free-speech issues existed, and that legitimate
free-speech claims could be raised on a case-by-case basis, the
concurrence stated that RICO should not be construed to include
an economic motive requirement in order to avoid the possibility
of confrontation with the First Amendment. 46
An examination of cases interpreting RICO's scope is neces-
sary in order to understand the Supreme Court's need to grant
certiorari to settle the inconsistencies that existed within the
federal courts. RICO was enacted by Congress in 1970"7 as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act ("OCCA")."' Sections 1961
and 1962 of RICO, which contain the terms "enterprise" and
"racketeering activity," were the primary sections that were
subject to contrasting interpretations regarding the unwritten
financial motive. 9
110.360 (1984)).
42. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806. The rule of lenity provides that where the
legislature's intent is not readily discernible from the act itself, the court will em-
ploy the less stringent meaning. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990).
43. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring). The First Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution precludes Congress from enacting a law that interferes with the exercise of
speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring).
47. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, Pub. L. No.
91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). See
note 38 and accompanying text for congressional findings in connection with RICO's
purpose.
48. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
941-48.
49. Section 1961 of RICO provides the definitions for "racketeering activity"
and "enterprise." 18 U.S.C. § 1961. See note 28 for the statutory definitions. Section
1962 sets forth the provisions for illegal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. See note 8 and
Vol. 33:159
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Following RICO's enactment, several of the federal courts
were confronted with the issue of the breadth of the term "enter-
prise" in RICO. In 1974, the term "enterprise" was first inter-
preted in a federal court of appeals in United States v.
Parness.° In Parness, the defendant was charged with obtain-
ing a foreign corporation through a pattern of racketeering acts,
including the transferring and concealing of gambling proceeds
and the denial of money due to the foreign corporation.5' The
defendant was convicted, and on appeal, the Second Circuit
addressed the issue of whether the term "enterprise" included a
nondomestic company that was acquired by illegal acts per-
formed in the United States.52 By relying on the literal defini-
tion of "enterprise" in section 1961" and by finding strong indi-
cations of congressional intent in RICO's legislative history, the
court found that the term "enterprise" was meant to have a
broad application.' The court concluded that the term "enter-
prise" encompassed any association and was not limited only to
domestic corporations."
Shortly after Parness, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Cappetto," dispensed with the argument that RICO enterprises
excluded illegal gambling associations. 7 In Cappetto, the court
was confronted with the argument that illegal businesses were
beyond the scope of RICO.' The Seventh Circuit relied on
RICO's statutory language59 and legislative history" in affirm-
accompanying text for the relevant provisions of §§ 1962(a)-(d).
50. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
51. Parness, 503 F.2d at 438.
52. Id. at 433, 438. The court recognized that an error may have occurred at
the district court level because of an alleged variance between the scheme of the
crime charged and the scheme that was presented to the jury. Id. at 438. However,
the court found that the error, if any, was harmless. Id.
53. Id. at 439.
54. Id. The court found support for a broad construction of "enterprise" in the
House Report on section 1962, which provides in pertinent part that any acquisition
of a victim enterprise is prohibited. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1970). The court also found a clear indication of congressional intent in RICO's
historical note, which explicitly provides that RICO is to be broadly construed to
accomplish RICO's corrective goals. Parness, 503 F.2d at 439 n.12 (citing Pub. L. No.
91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1104).
55. Parness, 503 F.2d at 439.
56. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
57. Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1358. Although the Parness case also involved a
gambling business, the question of whether illegal businesses were outside the realm
of RICO prosecutions was not addressed. See Parness, 503 F.2d at 439.
58. Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1358.
59. Id. The court noted that there were no indications in RICO's definitions or
substantive sections that an enterprise is limited to legitimate associations. Id.
60. Id. The court focused on a Senate Committee Report that directly referred
to the need to prevent gambling enterprises. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1994
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ing the district court's ruling that an illegal gambling business
was within the realm of RICO enterprises."' It held that busi-
nesses formed for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes were
RICO enterprises."2
With Parness and Cappetto as a foundation, an expansive
application of the term "enterprise" became prevalent in the
courts"s until the 1980 decision in United States v. Anderson."
Anderson was the first case to directly address whether an im-
plicit economic motive is necessary in the term "enterprise" to
maintain an action under RICO." The case involved county
officials allegedly involved in an enterprise engaged in acts of
fraud and false representations." The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas convicted the officials
of violations of sections 1962(c) and (d) of RICO. 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the convictions, assert-
ing that the officials were not associated in the type of enter-
prise that was actionable under RICO.'
By focusing first on the statutory language, the court noted
that the terms "enterprise" and "racketeering activity" were the
significant elements within the substantive offenses of section
1962.r9 The Eighth Circuit then probed into the legislative his-
1st Sess. (1969)).
61. Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1358.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (rejecting the contention that "enterprise" is applicable
only to infiltrated legitimate organizations); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (holding that all enterprises
that engage in a pattern of racketeering activity are within the realm of RICO en-
terprises); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977) (holding that "enterprise" encompasses any organization regardless
of whether the organization is legal or illegal).
The tendency to broadly construe enterprise has not proceeded without cau-
tion. See, e.g., Aleman, 609 F.2d at 311; Huber, 603 F.2d at 395-96; Rone, 598 F.2d
at 573-74; Altese, 542 F.2d at 107-10.
64. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
65. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1362. Both the definitions section and the substan-
tive offenses section of RICO contain the term "enterprise." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4),
1962(c) (1988).
66. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1361-62. The defendants were county judges who
were responsible for administering the counties' fiscal activities by authorizing expen-
ditures. Id. at 1361. The county judges were charged with forming an enterprise and
entering into business dealings whereby fake invoices were prepared and authorized
for payment. Id. at 1361-62.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Id. at 1372. The Eighth Circuit dealt solely with the implied economic
motive limitation in the term "enterprise." Id. at 1362. The Eighth Circuit did not
directly address the economic motive requirement in the term "racketeering activity".
Id. at 1362.
69. Id. at 1365-66. The Eighth Circuit found that a relationship existed be-
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tory, the economic nature of the offenses specified by Congress
as "racketeering," and the arrangement and content of the
OCCA in relation to RICO, and determined that the county
judges in Anderson were not considered an enterprise for the
purpose of a RICO prosecution." The court concluded that Con-
gress intended the term "enterprise" to include only those associ-
ations that operated with a financial purpose, and that claims
against enterprises that were not economically motivated were
not actionable under RICO.71
One year after Anderson, however, the United States Supreme
Court decided, in United States v. Turkette,72 that the defini-
tions section of RICO did not contain any restrictions on the
types of associations included as RICO enterprises.73 The Court
focused on whether the term "enterprise" was limited to legiti-
mate businesses.74 In Turkette, the defendants allegedly formed
an association that engaged in the unlawful distribution of
drugs, mail fraud, arson, and bribery.75 In viewing the statuto-
ry language as clear, conclusive, and lacking a contrary legisla-
tive intent, the Supreme Court in Turkette came to the same
conclusion as the Seventh Circuit in Cappetto, and held that
RICO enterprises included both. legitimate and illegitimate asso-
ciations."
The issue of whether RICO required the existence of an eco-
nomic motive in the predicate acts of an organization was decid-
ed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Ivic.77 The case involved four Croatian nationalists
tween the terms "enterprise" and "racketeering activity," and that the meaning of
.racketeering activity" served as a supporting inference that an enterprise was an
economically motivated association. Id. at 1366-68.
70. Id. at 1368-72. The court emphasized three primary areas in the legisla-
tive history that demonstrated RICO's purpose. Id. at 1371. First, congressional
statements stressed the importance of preventing the spread of racketeering; second,
recurrent legislative references regarded the need to prevent the infiltration of legal
organizations; third, Congress expressed wariness towards changing the traditional
balance among state and federal governments. Id. at 1370-71. The court also found
that the OCCA's provisions were drafted so that the traditional relationship between
the federal and state governments would not be disrupted absent a showing of ne-
cessity. Id. at 1370.
71. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.
72. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
73. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81.
74. Id. at 578.
75. Id. at 579. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to form
and participate in an enterprise that affected interstate commerce through racketeer-
ing acts. Id. at 578, 579. Specifically, the indictment charged the defendants with
violating § 1962(d) of RICO. Id. at 579.
76. Id. at 580-81.
77. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit directly addressed the
1994
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who joined a subversive movement formed for the purpose of
severing Croatia from Yugoslavia.78 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found the four
Croatians guilty of a conspiracy to violate RICO sections 1962(c)
and 1962(d).79 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the RICO
convictions and concluded that the indictment was not action-
able under RICO because the alleged acts were not financially
motivated.0
In reaching the conclusion that predicate acts of a RICO crime
must have an economic motive, the Second Circuit focused on
RICO's legislative history and the decision of the Supreme Court
in Turkette.s1 First, the court relied on Congress' emphasis on
the financial effects of racketeering throughout the statute's
legislative history. 2 Second, the court extracted from Turkette
the declaration that the essential purpose of RICO was the pre-
vention of the infiltration of legitimate businesses." Applying
the primary RICO purpose to the case at hand, the Ivic court
reasoned that the Croatians' terrorist acts did not raise issues of
infiltration because the acts were not economically oriented.'
Because the government failed to adequately demonstrate a
financial purpose with regard to the predicate acts, it failed to
issue of whether "racketeering activities" must be financially motivated. Ivic, 700
F.2d at 59, 63. In dictum, the court addressed whether "racketeering enterprises" are
subject to the economic motive limitation. Id. at 60, 63.
78. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 53. The Croatian nationalists actively engaged in terrorist
acts to eliminate opposition to and advance their interest in the separation of
Croatia and Yugoslavia. Id. at 53-55.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Id. at 70. Although the issue of whether RICO mandated an economic goal
was not fully argued at the district court level, the court of appeals raised the issue
and sought arguments on the specific matter. Id. at 59 n.5.
81. Id. at 61-65. In Turkette, the Supreme Court held that both legitimate and
illegitimate organizations were encompassed within RICO's definition of "enterprises".
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. In dictum, the Second Circuit in Ivic asserted that the
use of the term "enterprise" in §§ 1962(a) and (b) unquestionably signified a finan-
cially motivated entity. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60. The court then reasoned that the term
"enterprise" in § 1962(c) should be given the same meaning as that in §§ 1962(a)
and (b). Id. at 60. The .Ivic court further relied on a portion of the decision in
Thrkette that concluded that RICO applied to both legitimate and illegitimate en-
terprises that generated money to be used as the foundation for a legitimate enter-
prise. Id. at 63. Through a negative implication, the Iuic court reasoned that enter-
prises that did not produce such funds were not within the ambit of RICO. Ivic, 700
F.2d at 63.
82. lvic, 700 F.2d at 61-64. The court asserted that terrorist acts that lacked
an economic motive were not within the reach of RICO. Id. at 63. The court, howev-
er, noted that RICO may be applicable to terrorists who financed their operations by
engaging in robbery or extortion. Id. at 61 n.6.
83. Id. at 63 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591).
84. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63.
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state a RICO claim against the Croatian terrorists. 5
Three months later, the Second Circuit refined the Ivic deci-
sion in United States v. Bagaric,"8 holding that the government
could prove the existence of an economic motive in either the
predicate acts or the enterprise itself, and that the economic
motive need not be the primary and dominant motive. 7 As in
Ivic, Bagaric involved Croatian terrorists who committed acts of
violence to suppress opposition to their ultimate goal of Croatian
independence." The Croatians were charged and convicted with
violating RICO sections 1962(c) and 1962(d) in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 9 The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the convictions, distinguishing Bagaric
from Ivic by stressing that the Ivic terrorists operated with a
complete lack of economic purpose while the Bagaric terrorists
acted with both political and financial intentions." The court
stated that Ivic did not require all RICO enterprises to be pri-
marily motivated by profit-seeking reasons.9' In order to main-
tain an action under RICO, the Bagaric court required only an
objective determination that either the enterprise or the racke-
teering acts would have achieved some financial purpose.92
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit held that
the complete absence of an economic motive was not a defense to
a RICO claim in Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle.s3 In
McMonagle, an abortion clinic brought suit against anti-abortion
protestors for violations of RICO.9 The anti-abortion activists,
who were motivated by their political and religious beliefs,
85. Id. at 65.
86. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
87. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53, 56.
88. Id. at 46-51.
89. Id. at 42. See note 8 and accompanying text for substantive offenses of
sections 1962(c) and (d).
90. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53. In Bagaric, the Croatian terrorists were charged
with forcefully obtaining money from individuals to provide funding for their activi-
ties. Id. at 46-52. The terrorists raised money for their activities by sending letters
demanding monetary support and warning of retaliation against noncompliance. Id.
at 48-53. Some of the victims were physically and violently abused. Id.
91. Id. at 53.
92. Id. at 55.
93. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). In McMonagle,
the court focused on the requirement of a financial motive in a RICO claim based
on Hobbs Act violations. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. See note 10 for statutory
provisions of Hobbs Act. The court concluded that because the Hobbs Act did not re-
quire an economic motive, an economic motive was not necessary when a RICO
claim was based on the Hobbs Act. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. Thus, the court
did not directly address the issue of whether a financial motive was necessary under
RICO alone. Id.
94. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-47.
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formed a group that intimidated abortion seekers, illegally en-
tered and damaged abortion facilities, and physically interfered
with the commission of abortion services." The Third Circuit
affirmed the jury's verdict and held that an action under RICO
may be maintained against abortion protesters who engaged in
intimidation and harassment, notwithstanding the fact that an
economic motive did not exist."6 By focusing on the written text
of RICO, the court stated it did not have the power to impose
economic limitations that did not explicitly exist. 7 The court
concluded that political or personal motivations did not shield
conduct from being actionable under RICO."
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the diverging interpreta-
tions regarding RICO's scope that led to the necessity of a Su-
preme Court decision. Prior to Scheidler, some courts favored a
broad construction of RICO's application, while others limited
RICO prosecutions to enterprises or racketeering acts with an
economic motive.
For nearly a decade after RICO's enactment, with Parness and
Cappetto as the leading cases, the term enterprise was construed
expansively. Although the courts in the Parness and Cappetto
period did not address RICO's alleged economic requirement, the
circuit courts had a tendency to favor a broad interpretation of
enterprises over a limited interpretation. The Anderson decision
was the first case that directly confronted the reputed economic
motive limitation." Anderson restricted RICO enterprises to
those enterprises that operated with an underlying financial
purpose."°° One year later in Turkette, the Supreme Court re-
fused to impose unwritten restrictions on the breadth of RICO
enterprises.1"'
As with the Parness and Cappetto decisions, the Supreme
Court in Turkette did not directly address the financial motive
issue, and thus, the Turkette decision provided little guidance for
the circuit courts that were subsequently faced with the reputed
economic requirement. The Second and Eighth Circuits subse-
quently held that a financial motive was required in either the
95. Id. At the district court level, the jury found that the protestors had vio-
lated RICO, and the district judge denied the anti-abortion activists' motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 1347.
96. Id. at 1348, 1357.
97. Id. at 1348.
98. Id. The court also stated that the district judge had appropriately instruct-
ed the jury on the breadth of First Amendment protections. Id.
99. See notes 64-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Anderson.
100. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.
101. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Turkette.
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enterprise or predicate acts, while the Third Circuit held that
the absence of an economic motive did not immunize defendants
from RICO prosecution. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
to resolve the apparent conflict within the federal courts was
imperative.
The Court's decision in Scheidler was consistent with the
Court's inclination to give wide application to RICO. In Turkette,
the Supreme Court stated that the definitions section of the Act
did not place any limitations on the types of associations that
fell within the realm of RICO enterprises."° The Court's sound
statement was fully supported by the Congressional directive
that RICO be broadly interpreted to accomplish its correctional
objectives.1" Furthermore, RICO's text is plain, unambiguous,
and lacking in any reference to economic motives in either its
definitions or substantive sections; therefore, a probing examina-
tion of its legislative history is not necessary. However, if RICO
were considered to be ambiguous, its legislative history strength-
ens the conclusion that a financial motive is not required. Two
senate bills, one that would have restricted RICO enterprises to
"business enterprises,"' and another that would have exclud-
ed peaceful rallies that are not formed for economic reasons from
"racketeering acts,""5 were rejected by Congress. Clearly, if
Congress had intended that RICO prosecutions be grounded in
an underlying financial motive, Congress would not have dis-
carded the versions of the bill that would have imposed such a
requirement.
If an unwritten economic motive limitation were imposed,
then those who engaged in terrorist bombings and killings, as in
Ivic and Bagaric, and abortion harassment, obstruction, and
intimidation, as in McMonagle, would be protected from RICO
prosecutions merely by claiming that their motives were non-
economic in nature. Claiming a lack of a financial motive is a
rather weak foundation on which to base a defense. However, for
an Act that is primarily concerned with the effects of organized
crime on the national economy," 6 Congress may not have ex-
pected RICO to reach abortion activists, terrorists committed to
securing their nation's independence, and other groups that are
principally motivated by personal reasons rather than economic
ones.
102. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1988).
104. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969).
105. S. 438, 101st Cong., let Sess. § 3(e) (1989).
106. See note 38 for Statement of Findings and Purpose of RICO.
1994
172 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:159
The Supreme Court's decision in Scheidler brings politically,
socially, religiously, and personally motivated groups within the
realm of RICO. Conceivably, Congress had not intended RICO's
reach to be as expansive as it now is. However, any possibilities
of overreaching are inherent in the Act because of the
legislature's textual creation. The Court correctly refrained from
embarking on a judicial revision of the statute because the Court
has neither the responsibility nor the power to create statutory
restrictions where none exist. RICO's text is clear, unambiguous,
and lacking scope limitations. If RICO has been extended to
apply to enterprises and acts that Congress had not intended,
the responsibility lies with the legislature, not the courts, to
impose restrictions and to effectuate a change.
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